This paper analyzes the construction of the social assistance policy at the federal level in Brazil over the last two decades. It focuses on the Federal Constitution of 1988 and subsequent infra-constitutional legislation, especially that enacted during the Fernando Henrique Cardoso (FHC) and Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva (Lula) administrations, which showed very different conceptions of social policy. For both administrations, we analyze the consequences of the institutional changes and legal framework introduced as well as the social policy ideas that informed them.
Introduction
T he 1988 Constitution's recognition of social assistance as a public policy and its inclusion in the Brazilian Social Welfare System 1 makes that year a milestone from which this policy began to find its place in the Brazilian governmental decision-making arena. Given this context, studies on this policy became fertile ground for the understanding of a key issue in public policy analysis: the consolidation of a policy and the role of political and institutional factors in such process.
This article is a case study of the construction of the social assistance policy at the federal government level in Brazil over the last two decades. It focuses on the 1988 Federal Constitution and all infra-constitutional legislation produced in subsequent years, especially during the administrations of Presidents Fernando Henrique Cardoso -Brazilian Social Democracy Party (PSDB) -and Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva (Lula) -Workers' Party (PT). Both these administrations implemented institutional changes while presenting distinct conceptions of social policy. Our analysis depicts these changes and their impact for the building of the social assistance policy as well as the ideas and political projects that guided each administration initiatives.
The central argument is that the construction of social assistance as a public policy in Brazil demanded much more than the 1988 constitutional provisions. It required a subsequent infra-constitutional legislation to which the political project of the ruling party was also of great importance 2 . Hence, previous legal determinations operated as essential constraints (IMMERGUT, 1996; SKOCPOL, 1995) but the change in the image of social assistance in the political arena and in civil society was also a strong factor. This image was being prepared since the 1970s, in an incremental process which was influenced by the influence of formal and informal political actors and, in particular, by the role of presidents as representatives of specific political orientations.
The constitutional provisions and the institutional changes introduced by each administration constitute fertile soil for understanding the evolution of this policy. The changes can be understood mainly as the regulation of social assistance policy and the resulting functional reorganization of the State, which took place starting with the Constitution and more significantly during the Cardoso and Lula administrations.
1 In the 1988 Federal Constitution, Social Security (Seguridade Social) was defined as the system that encompasses three social policies: Social Security, Health and Social Assistance. In this paper we will translate this concept as "Social Welfare".
2 The Brazilian multiparty political system induces the formation of coalition governments for the formation of majorities. However, considering the leadership that the presidents' parties under analysis showed in the coalitions that were established, our position is that the political projects of their respective parties carried the greatest weight in determining the direction of social policies. the left, as noted by the power resources theory (ESPING-ANDERSEN, 1990) .
To this end, we use neo-institutional analytical categories that highlight the relevant determining factors in the explanation of public policy trajectory, as well as the role of ideas and values that legitimize some interests over others and guide institutional design (ESPING-ANDERSEN, 1990 OLSEN, 1997; SKOCPOL and AMENTA, 1986; SKOCPOL, 1995) . Our thesis is that legal constraints affect the action of actors and the shaping of public policies. We agree with Immergut's view, which holds that "all these institutional norms determine distinct logics in decision making that define the parameters of government action and of the influence of interest groups" (IMMERGUT, 1996, p. 03) .
By setting different rules, institutions have the ability to facilitate or obstruct the action plans of stakeholders and of those involved in the decision-making arena. Moreover, the establishment of these rules is influenced by values and ideas defended and disseminated by certain agents.
We work with the hypothesis of the importance of the conception of social policies found in a governmental project for institutional choices, assuming that these choices are indicators of ideology. The classic hypothesis is that parties on the left of the ideological spectrum tend to invest more in social policies than parties on the right. Furthermore, the neo-institutional literature on Welfare State suggests that it is not only constitutional structures that establish constraints on the actions of policy-makers and affect the possibilities for action by authorities. State structures (HUBER, RAGIN and STEPHENS, 1993) and the rules of the game do the same thing (IMMERGUT, 1996) . Huber et al (1993) suggest that state structures in particular act as contexts that differently constraint actors:
State structures serve as points of institutionalized veto against state welfare and are particularly constraining to leftist administrations. The existence of such veto points makes it difficult for leftist incumbents to implement generous and universalistic programs. In contrast, these veto points may have less effect on the policies of rightist administrations because the objective of such administrations is generally to preserve the status quo (HUBER, RAGIN and STEPHENS, 
1993, p. 745).
It is interesting to see how this proposition, which applies to countries with advanced economies, translates inversely to the Brazilian case, where the 1988 constitutional provisions became particularly constrictive for conservative governments 3 that aimed at paradigmatic changes in the type of social protection offered. In the period being analyzed, unlike the countries to which Huber et al (1993) refers, institutional constraints facilitated the action of the left and made it difficult for those who sought to change the status quo toward less comprehensive patterns of protection.
Our analysis is also guided by the concept of reform used by Draibe (2003) , which is restricted "to cases in which the changes affected the principles, structures, tough rules of a given policy" (DRAIBE, 2003, p. 67 ; free translation). The author divides the reforms'
analytical time into two phases: "the introduction -referred or confined to changes in the legal framework, in the new rules definition and even the initial institutional changes -and the implementation -referred to the execution process previously decided and initiated." (DRAIBE, 2003 ; free translation).
To develop this analysis we used, basically, the techniques of process tracing, indepth interviews, as well as assumptions that it is possible to make inferences from descriptive analyses (KING, KEOHANE and VERBA, 1994, p. 34) . Process tracing is suitable for analysis of inductive theories and hypotheses. Through case studies, the technique also makes it possible to construct relevant causal stories based on cause-and-effect relations (GEORGE and BENNET, 2005; MAHONEY, 2012) . We carried out an analysis of the laws, governmental programs, programs of political parties and other documents produced by federal policy coordinators. We also held interviews with four technicians 4 3 In general, the literature on parties seeks to identify them on an ideological spectrum ranging from the extreme right to the extreme left (LIMONGI and FIGUEIREDO, 1999; NICOLAU, 1998) . In the Brazilian case, given the coalition governments, this classification (left and right) does not contribute to the present analysis, since the same coalition may contain parties in different positions along the left-right spectrum. In this study we therefore use the distinction between conservative and progressive governments, with reference to the ideas that guided them regarding proposed and implemented social policies. We understand that there were no substantive differences in economic policy between FHC and Lula, but there were differences in their social policies: these policies were more residual and showed compensatory characteristics in the Cardoso administration, while there were changes in coverage, total spending and the structuring of an institutionalized field of non-contributory policies by the Lula administration. We therefore consider the Lula administration more progressive.
4 The identities of the interviewees were preserved, being identified as 1, 2, 3 and 4. All are social workers with over 25 years of experience in the field of social work. Three were active at the municipal state and/or federal level and one at the federal level only. Their careers in the area began before the changes envisaged by the Constitution. The interviews were conducted in 2011, bpsr Natália Guimarães Duarte Sátyro and Eleonora Schettini Martins Cunha who worked in the federal government for both administrations and who personally accompanied the implementation of legal provisions.
The paper is organized into five sections. The first briefly analyzes the constitutional provisions as a structural element of the subsequent construction of the social assistance policy; the constitutional assembly was the moment used by stakeholders to introduce a first reform cycle. In the second section we analyze the emergence of a conservative agenda by actors aiming at reversing or blocking policy change when they noticed the importance of the institutional framework established by the 1988 Constitution. The Cardoso administrations are analyzed in the third section. There we suggest that even when complying with the legal provisions the absence of an orientation to defend the structuring of a national social assistance policy made these two presidential terms a period with no effective progress in building and consolidating this policy, despite the implementation of important aspects anticipated in the infra-constitutional regulation. In the fourth section, we show how a president who indeed placed social assistance in his political project brought in structural elements for implementing the policy at the national level. Lastly, we present some final considerations.
The moment of introduction: the constitutional assembly
The construction of the legitimacy of social assistance as a public policy could be seen during the administration of President José Sarney (member of the Brazilian Democratic Movement Party -PMDB) (1985 to 1990) . Sarney recognized the existence of a "social debt" to the poorest strata of the population and considered this a pressing issue (MINISTÉRIO DAS RELAÇÕES EXTERIORES, 2008) . Although this problem took on a public dimension only during this period, debates among specialists working in the social assistance area had been going on since the 1970s in the search for alternatives to the conservative ways of understanding and addressing the social issue.
The social policy issue had mobilized social workers during the II Brazilian Congress of Social Workers (1976) and the closing session of the III Congress (1979) was attended by the then labor leader Luiz Inácio da Silva. The event was strongly marked by the professional's option to align with the working class. Since then, groups of intellectuals and professionals organized around the idea of social assistance as a citizen's right, to be assured by the State, as opposed to the century-old practice of leaving to philanthropic institutions (especially religious organizations) the care for those who had no access to the necessary during the Eighth National Conference on Social Assistance, in Brasilia, and had the objective of reconstructing the history of Social Assistance policy. They complement other interviews that have been conducted since 2005 with the same purpose. . Several academic and professional events were held during the following decade to address the issue, and spread the idea-force of social assistance as a right.
Here we highlight the importance of the political-institutional context of this brief but intense period that preceded the end of the military regime. During the 1970s semi-competitive legislative elections were held and the military opted for a gradual political liberalization as a way to weaken the opposition. There were only a pro-government party and a formal opposition party, respectively named National Renewal Alliance (ARENA) and Brazilian Democratic Movement (MDB). The dictatorial government suffered a significant defeat in the 1974 elections, when the MDB party won 59% of the votes for the Senate and 48% of the House of Deputies, and elected the mayors of most of the major cities. This political setback forced the military government to re-establish the multiparty system in the country in 1979. This was followed by a rearrangement of the party system and the birth of PMDB, the Workers' Party (PT) and the Democratic Labor Party (PDT) (FLEURY, 1994; HAGGARD and KAUFMAN, 2008) . In the 1980s, a slow and negotiated political opening process began, culminating in the election of the civilian Tancredo Another point to note is that the public policy community was comprised of a diverse set of social players including the LBA's Workers National Association (ANASSELBA), social worker's organizations, university professors (especially from the Catholic University of São Paulo), various professionals, members of numerous non-governmental organizations (PINHEIRO, 2008) .
Skeptics may minimize the importance given to the National Constitutional Assembly, to the extent that it is a constitutive Lowian arena by nature and, therefore, is naturally like a window of opportunity for all possible reforms. However, we emphasize that not all possible or desirable reforms succeeded or were made possible at the time, as was the case of the land reform. From that point on, not only did social assistance enter the public agenda, but it was also instituted as a citizen's right, which significantly changed the conservative paradigm that had guided actions in this policy area until that point, having traditionally left them to philanthropy, charity and uncoordinated programs at various governmental levels. Since then, many authors have shown how the 1988 Federal Constitution was a milestone in the construction of social protection in Brazil. The beginning of the paradigm shift was thereby presented as the recognition of social assistance policy as part of social welfare together with social security and health (COUTO et al, 2011; CUNHA, 2013; IPEA, 2009; SÁTYRO, 2010) . That is, at that time, there was a change in the principles that orient our object of analysis and that were achieved on the basis of subsequent regulations.
Among many paradigm changes brought about by the Constitution, Sátyro (2010) highlights those allowing the creation of legal redistributive mechanisms that tend to generate equality and create paths towards promoting national solidarity. This implied a different institutional design for social protection than previously existed, strongly based on the idea of social insurance, supported by contributions through work and formal employment. Since the 1930s, the social security system had been based on the nationalization of the pension system by President Getúlio Vargas (OLIVEIRA and TEIXEIRA, 1986) or, more specifically, since 1942 with the creation of the Brazilian Legion of Assistance (LBA). This setup was change at that moment by means of a shift from a Bismarckian paradigm to a Beveridgian one (BEVERIDGE REPORT, 1943 ) based on universal principles and social solidarity. There is no doubt that this step led to the overcoming of the (2005) highlight these changes. First, it is noteworthy that in Chapter II, entitled "On Social Welfare," in Article 194, the Constitution states that by law, it is the government's duty to organize social welfare based on the following principles: "the universality of coverage and care," "the uniformity and equivalence of services and benefits for urban and rural populations,"
"the selectivity and distributiveness of benefits and services," "the irreducible value of benefits," "the equity in funding participation," "the diversity of the funding base," and the guarantee of a "democratic and decentralized administration." Articles 201 and 203 are added, concerning social security and social assistance, respectively, and state that no benefit payment may be below the minimum wage. This results in equal wage levels for men and women, persons from rural and urban areas, and, finally, to contributors and non-contributors. This, coupled with the principle of irreducibility, eliminates the possibility of mere symbolic value benefits as previously provided, thus minimizing their use for political patronage.
Second, the introduction of the right to access to services by populations that need them strengthens the idea of social assistance as a public policy and allows the development of a series of governmental initiatives. Hence, the institutional construction of this policy was reinforced.
Third, it is important to note that elderly and disabled persons in extreme poverty have the right to a solidarity income. The explicit recognition of this right is one of the highlights in the creation of a legal redistributive mechanism that tends to generate equality. It was based on this constitutional precept that the Continuous Cash Benefit (BPC) was created and it has become a major income transfer program. We also call attention to the recognition of the not entirely contributive retirement right to rural workers who live in regimes of family-based economies. As Sátyro (2010) points out, these are aspects that clearly place national solidarity as defining characteristics of social protection. A fifth important aspect was the linking of the benefit amount to the minimum wage, which took on even greater importance during the Lula administration, with an explicit policy of protection of minimum wage benefits.
Thus, a new social protection paradigm emerged guaranteed by the Constitution, which directly impacted the construction of new social agendas, since it established rights, principles and provisions that directly affect governmental action. In the implementation that then took place the constitutional protection produced a profound change in policy conception, supply conditions, institutional organization and coverage. This step was bpsr Natália Guimarães Duarte Sátyro and Eleonora Schettini Martins Cunha essential in the long, still ongoing, process of establishing social rights in the institutional and legal framework of the Brazilian State, with real consequences in the government's role of ensuring these rights through public policy.
The changes that shaped this constitutive arena (LOWI, 1964 (LOWI, , 1972 led to intense institutional movements, much discussion and intense mobilization, including the approval of important laws in the 1990s. This implies, as Draibe (2003) 
1989-1993: a conservative agenda
With the enactment of the 1988 Constitution, there was a change in the setting and locus of the decision-making arena. At that moment decisions left the congressional arena and migrated mostly to the executive arena, which in this moment consisted of administrations with significantly conservative profiles. This allows one to see the importance of the basic framework set in the Constitution in order to protect the social assistance policy from more conservative moves. Constitutional constraints, in neo-institutionalist language, may not necessarily oblige action, but they constrain the attempts at backlashes at processes that have moved ahead.
Initially, certain important aspects of the period from 1989 to 1993 should be noted.
The enactment of the Federal Constitution showed that there was a need for further legislation to regulate various articles, including those regarding social assistance, since the Constitution itself determined that the transitional provisions on Social Welfare should be regulated within a maximum of twelve month's time. The following year, still during Sarney's administration, the first legislative elections were held for the federal level, and enacting this new legislation became the job of the newly elected Congress. In the executive area, Fernando Collor de Melo, a member of National Renovation Party (PRN), was elected president of Brazil, with a conservative discourse on social care, and imposed restrictive economic measures, which directly affected the quality of life of the workers. He What is clear from this brief history is that the construction of the Organic Law on Social Assistance was a much more lengthy and polemic process than the inclusion of the right in the Constitutional Assembly, as it took five years to be approved. The disputes took place among political and social groups in the legislative and executive arenas, especially the former, given the issue's legislative character and the fact that Congress was more favorable to regulation. In this process, the relationship among players from Congress, from the bureaucratic structure and from society was crucial to achieve the necessary social support to approve the Organic Social Assistance law. The democratic environment based on universal suffrage and multiparty system allows for real pressure from social and political organized groups creating constraints to state intervention, in this case, the state veto (ESPING-ANDERSEN, 1990; KORPI, 1983) . Constitutional provisions were regulated, on the one hand, according to the power pressure of these groups and, on the other, to the obligations imposed by the Constitution itself and subsequent regulations in this specific area. We understand that changes in the rules of the game allowed the social assistance policy community (KINGDON, 2003) , then a minority, to pressure the government to regulate what was determined by the constitution. The rules undermined the ability of the majority in the bureaucratic apparatus and government to block such innovations in the Brazilian social protection policy, barring any reversion to the previous model 6 .
However, despite all conservative approaches, the overall outcome was positive, as the Organic Law on Social Assistance was approved in 1993. An important aspect of this law is that it consolidates a decentralized and participatory policy which is constituted in the three spheres of government, by administrative agencies and deliberative institutions of a collegial character with a single command per government level. It establishes instruments for planning, management, finance and social control at national, state and municipal levels.
6 If we make a brief comparison between the time-length and processes of social assistance and health care construction we see that social assistance, despite having constitutional status was considered less legitimate than health care. If the efforts at structuring health stalled its implementation (MENICUCCI, 2007) , in social assistance, structuring processes greatly slowed down its effective entry in the decision-making process. In 1990, two years after the 1988 Federal Constitution approval, the Organic Law on Health (LOS) was enacted (Law 8080 of September, 1990 and Law 8142 of December, 1990) . Another determination in the Organic Law on Social Assistance was the provision that assistance is a State's responsibility in partnership with civil society organizations.
Here one can see the importance of the legacy of earlier policies. Since the colonial period social assistance had been provided social organizations with little investment by the State, which had insufficient equipment and human resources to take the responsibility for guaranteeing rights (CUNHA, 2013) . Therefore, the Organic Law on Social Assistance points to a necessary institutional reorganization that enabled its implementation, which depended on subsequent governments.
Cardoso administrations: two terms, two positions
The entire legal process in the first half of the 1990s was an important step toward the consolidation of social protection in Brazil, particularly of the social assistance policy.
However, the institutional evolution since the 1988 Constitution was marked by sharp discontinuities. Clearly, it was a process that qualified the public sector on the one hand, and political decisions on the other. In each administration during that decade one could see the institutional fragility marked by the setting up and dismantling of institutions. 1996) and implemented (1997) , with a more restrictive interpretation than that 7 According to Valente, when Cardoso suspended Basic Agenda, which was the articulation and focus of governmental actions at the municipal level, he left about ten million people without access to food allotments. Exemplary action of treatment by this administration was the suspension of international tenders for the purchase of iodate used to fortify salt and to prevent a number of diseases and disorders related to iodine deficiency (VALENTE, 2004) . During a period of over two years, not only this, but other programs were suspended, meaning a break with a long period of evolution, since organizations caring for the elderly, persons with disabilities and children had their resources cut off abruptly. According to Valente, the extinction of these programs was "part of compliance with the standards required by international agreements that established the suspension of policies of building up inventories and reducing spending on social programs of a more universal character" (VALENTE, 2004) .
8 This National Social Assistance Policy is rarely reported in the literature. For more, see (ALCHORNE, 2013 . According to Dye (2003) , considering that public policy is "whatever the government chooses to do or not to do," a concept based on the premise that a choice indicates the top authority's preferences, Cardoso's choice was for fiscal adjustment rather than for social protection as the trademark of social assistance policy.
In the absence of a strong action by the federal government, this was a period when What happened was an incremental process, both in the recognition of issues as problems to be addressed by social assistance, and in the setting up of an administrative or bureaucratic system to uphold these policies. In other words, no institutional foundations were set down to implement any social assistance policies. However, some linear and incremental changes were processed, but they cannot be considered as implementation of a reform that radically altered the policy. That is, Cardoso's actions from the point of view of social assistance remained a fragmented set of actions and programs working from a perspective of residual protection and provision of minimum social standards that had little to do with the provisions of the 1988 Constitution.
12 Besides these three, many other municipal governments also adopted some type of transfer program, including Belém, Belo Horizonte, Boa Vista, Catanduva, Ferraz de Vasconcellos, Franca, Guaratinguetá, Guariba, Goiânia, Jaboticabal, Jundiaí, Mundo Novo, Limeira, Osasco, Ourinhos, Paracatu, Piracicaba, Presidente Prudente, Santo André, São Francisco do Conde, São José do Conde, São José dos Campos, São Luiz, Tocantins and Vitória (LAVINAS, 1998; NÚCLEO DE SEGURIDADE E ASSISTÊNCIA SOCIAL, 1996) .
13 The debate in the assistance policy community encompassed two basic sides. On the one hand, there was a focus on the economic aspects of this type of program, with the argument that it would reduce the solution of inequality to the monetary aspect of social differences. Some used this argument to reject the strategy. On the other hand, among those who accepted the idea, the debate revolved mainly around the scope of the program -whether it should be universal or focused -and the establishment of conditions to be set down for persons to have access to it (SPOSATI, 1996; NÚCLEO DE SEGURIDADE E ASSISTÊNCIA SOCIAL, 1996) .
14 Olsen (1997) considers that institutional changes are revolutionary when they occur quickly and significantly, and thus alter the social order. They are radical when they occur quickly and significantly, altering governance but not the social order. And they are incremental when they occur slowly and gradually, with long-term consequences. The lack of coordination observed at the beginning was replaced by a new rearrangement of actors in the political arena. The party that had long been opposition was learning how to govern and impose its governance projects, while the long-time situation groups were learning how to be opposition. There was an unprecedented political context 16 The Special Ministry for Food Security and Fight Against Hunger (MESA) was responsible for structuring and implementing the Zero Hunger Program the first initiative of the new government to coordinate actions to fight hunger, malnutrition, and extreme poverty by promoting food and nutritional security. The program gave greater public visibility to the government's social agenda and, at the same time, had the merit of returning obligations in this area to the State, which had been diluted into organizations of civil society in the previous administration through the Community Solidarity Program, which financed them. However, the expected applause was not forthcoming. The program came under heavy fire from experts on the conception and the strategies used and it resulted in failure. A year after being launched, it was abandoned as the government's main action, but its space was quickly occupied by the Family Support Program (Programa Bolsa Família). bpsr Natália Guimarães Duarte Sátyro and Eleonora Schettini Martins Cunha in Brazil in which social and political groups who had long been external actors in decision-making were now able to directly pressure and act within the government. Not only was the president's party importance and influence in defining the presidential agenda reinforced, but the ability of organized groups to pressure also became much greater.
At this point it is important to call attention to the central role of Minister Patrus Ananias de Sousa as Minister of Social Development and Combat against Hunger (MDS) in the executive arena. This is a relevant factor, since individuals who occupy the upper levels of bureaucracies as ministers and ministerial executive secretaries not only can reorient the priorities of the government agenda, but also pay attention to and observe previously existing issues (EVANS, RUESCHEMEYER and SKOCPOL, 1985; KINGDON, 2003) . This minister, who had been mayor of Belo Horizonte, where he implemented significant reforms in the social welfare policy, firmly stated his commitment to the presidential political project, and organized the Ministry by appointing experts in the area to the top board and to the upper levels of the bureaucracy, all being persons with recognized expertise, some of them having been active in this field since the formulation of the pertinent articles in the constitution and in the Organic Law on Social Assistance as well as they were active militants of the Social Assistance Movement (Interviewees 2, 3 and 4).
The new political context with a progressive administration having reached the federal government proved extremely favorable for the implementation of reforms that, according to Draibe (2003) , would give continuity to the introductory reform expressed in the Federal Constitution and the Organic Law on Social Assistance. Lula's political project for social assistance included three dimensions: the regulation of social assistance, the construction of the administrative apparatus, and an institutional framework for providing social care services and income transfers. In the first dimension, in 2003, the Fourth National Conference on Social Assistance was held, and called for the immediate implementation of the Unified Social Assistance System. The decision found positive and converging resonance in the Ministry, initiating efforts to regulate the system, which occurred the following year, with the approval of the National Social Assistance Policy (PNAS-2004) by CNAS. The policy was widely discussed across the country with congress members, other levels of government and other political actors, such as managers, representatives of non-governmental organizations, social movements, experts, forming a broad coalition of support for its development and implementation (Interviewees 1, 2 and 3).
The National Social Assistance Policy (PNAS-2004) can be considered a new regulatory framework for social assistance. One major change was the shift in the logic of protection. Social assistance had previously been focused on "target groups," in different segments considered vulnerable, but the focus was redirected to ensure "securities" (security of acceptance, of coexistence, of development, of autonomy, of circumstantial risk and special -that structured how social assistance services would be provided. The definition of services that are specific to this policy area, not only give it its own identity. It also guided providers of public and private services as to the actions for each type of security and how they should be offered. Brazilian and world history. An important aspect is that the four previous programs were not articulated among one another, each one having its own executive agency, overlapping objectives and target audience, with separate information systems that did not communicate. This allowed one family to receive all four benefits while others would receive none, even with the same conditions of eligibility. None of these programs was intended to become universal, nor was any of them nationwide. The sizes of benefits and inclusion 18 The National Social Assistance Policy sets the groundwork for the consolidation of social care services by reaffirming the public responsibility in providing these services and confirming the new role of the State in this area, providing for the integration of private organizations as co-participants, reaffirming the propositions in Organic Law on Social Assistance. Finally, an important step standardized the protections provided under its responsibility and establishes them not only by territory but also by complexity (MINISTÉRIO DO DESENVOLVIMENTO SOCIAL E DO COMBATE À FOME, 2004).
19 The Family Support Program (Programa Bolsa Família) is the combination of the Scholarship Program (Bolsa Escola), Food Grants (Bolsa Alimentação) and Cooking Gas Allowance Therefore, the change in the structuring of the social assistance policy is evident, as described by Sátyro (2010) . Until the early 2000s the government's participation in providing social care services was limited to financing the Continuing Action Services (SAC) offered by states, municipalities or nonprofit organizations with historical links with the Ministry. The program was structured according to target audiences, especially persons with disabilities, the elderly, children and adolescents, through agreements with local governments, which monitored and inspected the service providing organizations.
This structure was changed by the Lula administration.
In summary, at the first stage two important regulatory milestones were established:
the National Social Assistance Policy-2004 and the Basic Operational Norm-Unified Social Assistance System-2005, which allowed the system to be structured, and the strengthening of income transfers aimed at universal coverage for its target population. A second stage was the actual implementation of the social care service system, which ensured protection and guaranteed security. Finally, a conditional cash transfer program was implemented with a universalizing logic. It reached very significant numbers of persons.
The intensity of the changes promoted by the Lula administration allows us to say that effective reforms were implemented and produced radical changes. They represented a turning point in the history of social assistance policy, especially in view of the lack of significance of previous regulations. The question that now comes up is, why were the actions under Cardoso restrictive regarding social assistance policy and under Lula they were not? There is no denying the innovations brought about by Fernando Henrique Cardoso, such as the Continuous Cash Benefit (BPC), the Child Labor Eradication Program (PETI) and the incipient cash transfer programs. However, the norms lacked significance from the point of view of the construction of the social assistance policy. Cardoso carried out necessary innovative actions based on solidarity, but they only partially complied with what was constitutionally determined and followed a restricted and fragmented agenda.
But institutionalized policies were not sufficiently constructed to respond to the principles of universal social protection determined by the Federal Constitution of 1988. There was a different project: certain social rights for specific groups were set up and the idea of a security system based on solidarity entered the specific guidelines of the area during the Cardoso administration. But the social assistance policy was only residual in his political project.
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It was under Lula that social assistance found the political and institutional conditions that allowed for significant changes that have come to redefine the social assistance policy and effectively implement it in the conception of a single decentralized and participatory system, as provided in the first round of reforms when social assistance was assured as a citizen's right. The president had the orientation of his party, now governing the country and facing issues related to social assistance. Thus, he gave this policy weight and significance during his administration, transforming it into a decisive agenda. It was for this purpose that persons who were also committed to this political project were placed at upper levels of this area, especially the minister, and all functioned as important political actors in the process of change.
It can therefore be said that the construction and consolidation of a social protection system called for by the Federal Constitution was only possible from the moment that two factors interacted. On the one hand, the existence of institutional rules that determined the construction of more generous and comprehensive programs, granting rights to the most vulnerable segments of the population and including the principle of solidarity in the system. On the other hand, a more progressive party took over the country, interested in changing the status quo. Also, alternatives for driving the agenda were available and relied on the presence of a broad spectrum of different political groups, including experts, professionals, non-governmental organizations, social movements and other civil society actors. The conditions for making changes were established.
Final considerations
The analysis of the recent history of Brazilian social assistance policy make it clear that the social protection right set in the 1988 Constitution was crucial to ensure both the institutionalization of this right in the Brazilian State and its construction during the federal administrations that followed. We have tried to show the differences in the initiatives taken at the Federal Executive Branch in regulating this new public policy by pointing out the importance of the ideology of each president's party in determining his own political project, especially his social policy.
Both President Cardoso and President Lula, early in their terms, brought about significant institutional changes in social assistance policy. However, under President Cardoso, changes were heavily marked by the attempt to minimize the actions in this area whereas, in Lula administration, changes were directed to building up a new conception of social protection.
A first aspect of these changes concerns the organizational structure itself, since, at the beginning of each administration, important changes took place involving the However, a second aspect, and certainly the most important, concerns social assistance policy itself and its correspondence to the directions of each administration. As other authors already pointed out (ALMEIDA, 2004; COSTA, 2009; DRAIBE, 2003) , it is not possible to identify a continuous social and political project between the Cardoso and the Lula administrations. First, because the decisions and actions taken during the Cardoso administration failed to replace the fragmented and uncoordinated way that social assistance had inherited. This fact is evidenced by the creation of a structure parallel to the Ministry of Social Security and Social Service (MPAS) -the Community Solidarity Program -which clearly took over the government's social agenda at the expense of the Ministry of Social Security and Social Service (MPAS), which, legally had the power and authority to coordinate the policy at the federal level. The National Conferences on social assistance in 1995 and 1997 criticized this situation and proposed the extinction of the program, which the government did not do. Besides, the initiatives for constitutional and legal precepts provided in the Organic Law on Social Assistance were very timid and did not produce significant changes in the organization and operation of a policy system as determined by the norms.
Only after a more progressive administration assumed power could a social agenda clearly take place as a responsibility of the State. It was therefore a point in the government's strategic plan that allowed for a national social assistance policy to be institutionalized, replacing a mere fragmented variety of assistance programs. This policy was strongly based on two pillars, one being conditional cash transfer and other being the structuring of the Unified Social Assistance System. This system introduced significant changes in the relationship among the states and their role within the system, in the form of federal funding, in the organization of social protection, in the role of negotiation levels, agreements, deliberation and participation. In the case of participation, one can affirm that the Lula administration fulfilled a determination that had been taken at the National Conferences on Social Assistance since 1995 and that was evident again in 2003, namely, the implementation of the Unified Social Assistance System. It is this distinction between the two administrations that this article points out. There were substantial differences in the governmental programs of the two administrations in bpsr Natália Guimarães Duarte Sátyro and Eleonora Schettini Martins Cunha regard to social issues and they can be seen as well in their political projects. This allows us to say that it was the presence of a more progressive party in power that enabled the institutionalization of new policies, since political groups, specifically, the policy community had their capacity to act enhanced.
Finally, a finding of this paper is the importance of the backing for the rules of the game from other factors. The study strongly suggests that the action of the administrations analyzed was based on constitutional provisions and their subsequent regulations, but they alone did not determine the final result. The introduction of new rules constrained the government's choices regardless of specific orientations or fiscal pressures. This became a protective barrier against the action of the conservative Collor administration, for instance. The Cardoso administration only partially fulfilled the legal provisions, as it inserted important aspects of social protection based on national solidarity but failed to structure a policy. It was only the combination of the institutional foundation with more progressive orientations that made it possible to consolidate the National Social Assistance Policy. In other words, it is clear that the first moment of reform, the National Constitutional Assembly, was crucial for the construction of the social assistance policy during these two decades, but the ideological orientations of the parties in government were also decisive for its effective implementation.
Therefore, the explanatory potential of the new structures called for by the Constitution and its regulations occurred in interaction with the arrangement of political forces within each government, either more conservative or more progressive. Constitutional provisions by themselves did not push the social assistance policy when the ideological preferences of the ruling party were more conservative. Instead, its effect was to avoid backslides desired by conservatives in reaction to the new rules, especially regarding the allocation of new funding sources (FAGNANI, 1999) . We understand that in politics not to move backwards can be as significant as moving ahead at other times. The constitutional rules allowed the action of external pressure groups to block vetoes imposed by the president. In more conservative administrations, closer to the center, as were the Cardoso's, the implementation of programs were clearly determined by the 1988 Constitution, such as the Continuous Cash Benefit. Then, given the preference for fiscal adjustment, the result was mainly lack of action in restructuring the social assistance policy. Finally, a more progressive administration used these new rules to change the status quo, then structuring the social assistance policy toward principles of non-contribution and more comprehensive entitlement that represents the attainment of full citizenship. 
